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Recalibrating Cy Pres Settlements to
Restore the Equilibrium
Michael J. Slobom*
ABSTRACT
Class action settlement funds become “non-distributable”
when class members fail to claim their share of the settlement or
the cost of distribution exceeds the value of individual claims.
Before 1974, parties had two options for disposing of non-distrib-
utable funds:  escheatment to the state or reversion to the defen-
dant.  Both options undermine unique objectives of the class
action—namely, compensating small individual harms and deter-
ring misconduct.
To balance the undermining effects of escheatment and re-
version, courts incorporated the charitable trust doctrine of cy
pres into the class action settlements context. Cy pres distribu-
tions direct non-distributable settlement funds to charities whose
work aligns “as near as possible” with the interests of the class.
The class thus receives an indirect benefit from the distribution
that it would not have received through escheatment or
reversion.
Federal courts have struggled to delineate requirements for
cy pres settlements, and as a result, inconsistent approaches to
the issue have emerged.  This Comment examines those inconsis-
tencies in light of the theory behind the doctrine’s importation
into the class action context.  It argues that the inconsistent ap-
proaches to cy pres settlements reflect unspoken judicial prefer-
ences for one of the two class action objectives that cy pres
preserves.
This Comment begins by examining the history and modern
principles of cy pres settlements.  Next, it explores four federal
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circuit courts’ approaches to cy pres settlements and considers
how each approach reflects the respective court’s preference for
one class action objective over the other.  This Comment then
argues that courts should recalibrate their methods of assessing
cy pres settlements to account for the theory behind the doc-
trine’s importation into the class action settlements context.  Fi-
nally, it proposes a framework for assessing cy pres settlements
that accounts for that theory.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 282 R
II. BACKGROUND . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 285 R
A. The Origins of Cy Pres: Charitable Trusts . . . . . . . . 285 R
B. The Doctrine’s Importation into Class Actions . . . . 285 R
C. Modern Application of Cy Pres in Class Actions . . 288 R
1. Types of Cy Pres Distributions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 289 R
2. Considerations in Assessing Cy Pres
Distributions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 290 R
III. ANALYSIS OF THE CIRCUIT SPLIT AND A PROPOSED
SOLUTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 292 R
A. Courts that Favor the Compensation Objective . . . . 295 R
1. The Third Circuit’s “Degree of Direct Benefit”
Test . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 295 R
2. The Eighth Circuit’s Strict Adherence to the
“Next Best Recipient” Principle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 297 R
B. Preserving Deterrence: The Seventh Circuit’s
“Purely Punitive” Approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 299 R
C. Linking Cy Pres to the Litigation: The Ninth
Circuit’s Approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 301 R
D. Assessing the Current State of Cy Pres Among the
Circuits . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 302 R
E. Balancing the Objectives: A Proposed Solution . . . 303 R
1. The Triggering Requirement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 303 R
2. The Nexus Requirement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 304 R
IV. CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 306 R
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1966, Congress amended the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure, and the modern-day money damages class action was born.1
1. Scott Dodson, An Opt-In Option for Class Actions, 115 MICH. L. REV. 171,
177 (2016) (noting that the 1966 amendments produced the modern iteration of
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23).
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Under the revised version of Rule 23,2 a final judgment in a Rule
23(b)(3) class action3—commonly referred to as a “mandatory”
class action4—binds all individuals who share an issue of law or fact
in common with the class.5  To exclude oneself from the final judg-
ment in a mandatory class action, an individual must affirmatively
opt out of the class.6  Shortly after the 1966 amendments went into
effect, parties to mandatory class actions began encountering new
problems at the settlement stage as large sums of settlement funds
often remained unclaimed.7  In many instances, class members sim-
ply failed to claim their awards.8  When awards remained un-
claimed, the parties could dispose of the unclaimed funds through
escheatment to the state9 or reversion to the defendant.10  Both op-
tions, however, undermine unique objectives of the class action—
namely, compensating small individual harms and deterring
misconduct.11
In an effort to avoid the undermining effects of escheatment
and reversion, courts began to dispose of unclaimed settlement
funds through the charitable trust doctrine of cy pres.12  In the con-
2. The relevant portions of the 1966 version of Rule 23 are mostly still in
effect today. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3).
3. A Rule 23(b)(3) class action may proceed if the “court finds that the ques-
tions of law or fact common to class members predominate over any questions
affecting only individual members, and that a class action is superior to other avail-
able methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the controversy.” FED. R. CIV.
P. 23(b)(3).
4. See generally Linda S. Mullenix, No Exit: Mandatory Class Actions in the
New Millennium and the Blurring of Categorical Imperatives, 2003 U. CHI. LEGAL
F. 177 (2003) (discussing the evolution of the mandatory class action since the 1966
amendments).
5. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(3)(B).
6. Id.
7. See, e.g., West Virginia v. Chas. Pfizer & Co., 440 F.2d 1079, 1083–84 (2d
Cir. 1971) (discussing the lack of response from consumer class members that re-
sulted in $20 million in unclaimed settlement funds).
8. Id.
9. See Hodgson v. YB Quezada, 498 F.2d 5, 6 (9th Cir. 1974) (finding escheat-
ment of unclaimed settlement funds to the Treasury of the United States proper);
Hodgson v. Wheaton Glass Co., 446 F.2d 527, 536 (3d Cir. 1971) (holding that
unclaimed settlement funds escheat to the government).
10. See Stewart R. Shepherd, Comment, Damage Distribution in Class Ac-
tions: The Cy Pres Remedy, 39 U. CHI. L. REV. 448, 449–50 (1972) (discussing
courts that have “redefine[d] the class” to deal with residual funds).
11. See In re Baby Prods. Antitrust Litig., 708 F.3d 163, 172 (3d Cir. 2013).
12. See, e.g., Miller v. Steinbach, No. 66 Civ. 356, 1974 WL 350, at *1
(S.D.N.Y. Jan. 3, 1974) (approving the application of the cy pres doctrine to the
class action settlement context).  It is generally believed that the term “cy pres”
derives from the Norman French phrase “cy pres comme possible,” which trans-
lates to “as near as possible.” See EDITH L. FISCH, THE CY PRES DOCTRINE IN
THE UNITED STATES 1 (1950).
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text of class action settlements, the cy pres doctrine allows parties to
distribute otherwise “non-distributable” settlement funds to the
“next best recipient.”13  Class action settlement funds become non-
distributable when class members fail to claim their shares of the
settlement14 or when the cost of distribution exceeds the value of
the individual claims.15  Courts often deem charitable organizations
whose interests align with the class’s interests the “next best
recipient.”16
The United States Supreme Court will review its first cy pres
settlement case in its October 2018 term.17  While the Court has
never addressed the issue of cy pres settlements, Chief Justice Rob-
erts has signaled his “fundamental concerns surrounding the use of
such remedies in class action litigation.”18  The Court’s decision to
address the issue now is unsurprising.  In recent years, cy pres distri-
butions have become more prominent features of class action set-
tlements,19 and federal circuit courts have struggled to delineate
requirements for assessing such settlements.20  As a result, inconsis-
tent approaches to the issue have emerged.21
This Comment examines those inconsistencies against the the-
ory behind the doctrine’s importation into the class action context.
It argues that the courts’ inconsistent approaches reflect unspoken
judicial preferences for one of the two class action objectives that cy
pres preserves.
Part II of this Comment examines the history and modern prin-
ciples of cy pres settlements.  Part III explores four federal circuit
courts’ approaches to cy pres settlements22 and considers how each
approach reflects the respective court’s preference for one class ac-
13. In re Google Referrer Header Privacy Litig., 869 F.3d 737, 741 (9th Cir.
2017).
14. See, e.g., Powell v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 119 F.3d 703, 706–07 (8th Cir.
1997) (finding the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it approved a cy pres
distribution of unclaimed funds after all individual claims had been satisfied).
15. See, e.g., Lane v. Facebook, Inc., 696 F.3d 811, 825 (9th Cir. 2012) (af-
firming the district court’s approval of a cy pres-only settlement on the grounds
that individual awards would be de minimis).
16. See, e.g., id. at 822.
17. See In re Google, 869 F.3d 737, cert. granted, 86 U.S.L.W. 3552 (U.S. Apr.
30, 2018) (No. 17-961).
18. Marek v. Lane, 134 S. Ct. 8, 9 (2013) (Roberts, C.J., statement respecting
the denial of certiorari).
19. Martin H. Redish, Peter Julian & Samantha Zyontz, Cy Pres Relief and
the Pathologies of the Modern Class Action: A Normative and Empirical Analysis,
62 FLA. L. REV. 617, 653 (2010).
20. See infra Part III.A–C.
21. See infra Part III.A–C.
22. See infra Part III.A–C.
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tion objective over the other.23  Part III argues that courts should
recalibrate their methods of assessing cy pres settlements to account
for the theory behind the doctrine’s importation into the class ac-
tion settlements context.24  Part III then proposes a new framework
for assessing cy pres settlements.25  Finally, Part IV concludes with
suggestions for the future of cy pres settlements.
II. BACKGROUND
A. The Origins of Cy Pres: Charitable Trusts
The cy pres doctrine originated in the context of charitable
trusts.26  In that context, cy pres serves as a means to effectuate a
donor’s intent for the trust when intervening circumstances have
rendered strict adherence to the donor’s stated purpose impossible,
unlawful, or impracticable.27  The doctrine allows courts to redirect
the corpus28 to a charitable purpose that “reasonably approxi-
mates” the testator’s original intent.29  For instance, after the pas-
sage of the Thirteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution, a court used cy pres to redirect a trust supporting the
abolition of slavery to support instead educational opportunities for
poor African-Americans.30
B. The Doctrine’s Importation into Class Actions
Courts incorporated the cy pres doctrine into the class action31
context in response to an unforeseen consequence of the 1966
amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.32  The origi-
23. See infra Part III.D.
24. See infra Part III.D.
25. See infra Part III.E.
26. Charitable trusts are distinct from private trusts.  In the context of private
trusts, the corpus—the subject property of the trust—is devoted to specific persons
who are designated as beneficiaries of the trust. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
TRUSTS § 1 cmt. c (AM. LAW INST. 2012).  In the context of charitable trusts, the
corpus is devoted to a charitable purpose and the public is designated as the bene-
ficiary. See id.
27. See In re Baby Prods. Antitrust Litig., 708 F.3d 163, 168 n.2 (3d Cir. 2013)
(discussing the origins of the cy pres doctrine); Shepherd, supra note 10, at 452.
28. See sources cited supra note 27.
29. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 67.
30. See Jackson v. Phillips, 96 Mass. 539, 596 (1867).
31. The class action is a procedural device that permits one or more plaintiffs
to file and prosecute a lawsuit on behalf of a larger group. See Califano v.
Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682, 700–01 (1979).
32. See Shepherd, supra note 10, at 450–53 (suggesting that courts utilize the
cy pres doctrine to avoid the problem of uncollected damages in class actions that
resulted from the 1966 amendments).
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nal version of Rule 23 provided for the so-called “spurious”33 class
action34 in which class members made separate claims involving
common “question[s] of law or fact.”35  Judgments in spurious class
actions did not bind absent class members.36  Instead, the final judg-
ment in a spurious class action bound individuals only if they opted
in to the class.37
The 1966 amendments replaced the spurious class action with
the Rule 23(b)(3) “mandatory” class action and thus widened the
permissible circumstances38 of class certification.39  Mandatory class
actions may proceed despite absent class members.40  Thus, under
the amended version of Rule 23, the final judgment in a mandatory
class action binds all persons who did not affirmatively opt out of
the suit, even if they were unaware of or unwilling to participate in
the suit.41
If the parties reach a settlement, they must provide notice to
the class,42 and the court may afford the members an opportunity to
opt out of the settlement to preserve their individual claims.43  Indi-
viduals who do not opt out of the settlement become eligible to
receive a share of the damages upon the court’s final approval of
the settlement.44  Due to the structure of class actions brought
33. See Green v. Wolf Corp., 406 F.2d 291, 297 (2d Cir. 1968) (discussing the
spurious class action under the 1938 version of Rule 23).
34. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(3) (1937) (amended 1966).
35. Id.
36. Green, 406 F.2d at 297.
37. Id.
38. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 362 (2011) (“[Rule 23(b)(3)
of the 1966 amendments] allows class certification in a much wider set of circum-
stances but with greater procedural protections.”).
39. A court must certify a class before a lawsuit may proceed as a class action.
See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(1)(A).  To obtain certification, the claimant must satisfy
each of the four prerequisites under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a) and at
least one of the three requirements under Rule 23(b).  Comcast Corp. v. Behrend,
569 U.S. 27, 33 (2013).
40. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3).
41. Id. 23(c)(3)(B) (“Whether or not favorable to the class, the judgment in a
class action must . . . include and specify or describe those to whom the Rule
23(c)(2) notice was directed, who have not requested exclusion, and whom the
court finds to be class members.”); see also J. Russell Jackson, Class Actions and
the Implications of Rule 23, SCOTUSBLOG (Sept. 12, 2011, 2:26 PM), http://bit.ly/
2xcvCKq (discussing the historical effects of the 1966 amendments to Rule 23).
42. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(1).
43. Id. 23(e)(4).
44. See id. 23(e) (“The claims, issues, or defenses of a certified class may be
settled . . . only with the court’s approval.”); Christine P. Bartholomew, Saving
Charitable Settlements, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 3241, 3247 (2015).
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under Rule 23(b)(3), however, distribution of individual awards
often becomes problematic.45
Rule 23(b)(3) class actions include all injured persons in the
class for purposes of calculating damages, even if the court did not
recognize them as plaintiffs at the start of the litigation.46  The dis-
tribution of damages thus depends on identifying and locating class
members post-settlement47 as well as class members affirmatively
claiming their shares of the award.48  However, class members fre-
quently fail to respond to settlement notices;49 some class members
never hear about the settlement at all.50  As a result, large sums of
settlement funds go unclaimed.51
A 1972 law review comment52 by University of Chicago Law
School student Stewart R. Shepherd is widely credited as the first
proposal to import the cy pres doctrine into the class action con-
text.53  Prior to the doctrine’s importation, judges and parties re-
sorted to one of two options to dispose of unclaimed damages:
reversion to the defendant54 or escheatment to the state.55
Both judges56 and academics57 have criticized the practice of
reverting settlement funds to the defendant.  Reversion undermines
45. See, e.g., Linda S. Mullenix, Settlements, in A PRACTITIONER’S GUIDE TO
CLASS ACTIONS 177, 236–37 (Mary Hogan Greer ed., 2d ed. 2017) (discussing dis-
tribution problems that result from large class actions).
46. See id. at 236; Rhonda Wasserman, Cy Pres in Class Action Settlements, 88
S. CAL. L. REV. 97, 102–05 (2014) (discussing the “underlying problem” of un-
claimed or non-distributable funds).
47. Mullenix, supra note 45, at 236.
48. Wasserman, supra note 46, at 104–05.
49. See, e.g., West Virginia v. Chas. Pfizer & Co., 440 F.2d 1079, 1083–84 (2d
Cir. 1971) (discussing the lack of response from consumer class members that re-
sulted in $20 million in unclaimed settlement funds).
50. See, e.g., Six (6) Mexican Workers v. Ariz. Citrus Growers, 904 F.2d 1301,
1307–08 (9th Cir. 1990) (finding it likely that many class members would not learn
of the settlement due to the defendant’s failure to keep records of its employees).
51. See WILLIAM B. RUBENSTEIN, NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 12:28 (5th
ed. 2017) (discussing the various situations that prevent courts from distributing
class action damages).
52. See Shepherd, supra note 10.
53. See, e.g., In re Baby Prods. Antitrust Litig., 708 F.3d 163, 172 (3d Cir.
2013) (crediting Shepherd’s comment as the first proposal to use cy pres for dispos-
ing of excess class action settlement funds).
54. See Shepherd, supra note 10, at 449–50 (discussing courts that have “rede-
fine[d] the class” to deal with residual funds).
55. See Hodgson v. YB Quezada, 498 F.2d 5, 9 (9th Cir. 1974) (finding es-
cheatment of unclaimed settlement funds to the Treasury of the United States
proper); Hodgson v. Wheaton Glass Co., 446 F.2d 527, 536 (3d Cir. 1971) (holding
that unclaimed settlement funds escheat to the government).
56. See, e.g., In re Baby Prods., 708 F.3d at 172 (“Reversion to the defendant
risks undermining the deterrent effect of class actions by rewarding defendants for
the failure of class members to collect their share of the settlement.”).
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the “deterrent effect of class actions by rewarding defendants for
the failure of class members” to claim their shares of the settle-
ment.58  And while escheatment preserves the deterrent value of a
suit,59 it undermines individual compensation by distributing the
settlement to the broader community.60
Shepherd argued that the cy pres doctrine would provide a bal-
anced alternative for distributing unclaimed settlement funds.61
Shepherd proposed directing residual settlement funds to the
“‘next best’ class.”62  He suggested that the parties could effectuate
the legislature’s intent by directing settlement residue to charitable
organizations whose interests align with the underlying cause of
action.63
In 1974, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of
New York became the first federal court to approve the use of cy
pres outside the context of charitable trusts.64  In a decision approv-
ing a settlement in a shareholders’ derivative suit, the court charac-
terized the terms of the agreement as a “variant of the cy pres
doctrine.”65  The court concluded that the terms were proper in
light of the “modest size of the settlement fund and the vast number
of shares among which it would have to be divided.”66
C. Modern Application of Cy Pres in Class Actions
Since Steinbach, courts have applied cy pres outside the chari-
table trust context with ever-increasing frequency.67  Today, cy pres
is a common feature of class action settlements.68  Most circuits
57. See, e.g., Shepherd, supra note 10, at 450 (“[Reversion] lead[s] to unjust
enrichment of the defendant and decrease[s] the deterrent effect of the
judgment.”).
58. In re Baby Prods., 708 F.3d at 172; see also Hughes v. Kore of Ind. Enter.,
731 F.3d 672, 676 (7th Cir. 2013) (finding that the purpose of cy pres in class action
settlements is to prevent the unjust enrichment of the defendant).
59. In re Baby Prods., 708 F.3d at 172.
60. Id.; Bartholomew, supra note 44, at 3249 (“[E]scheatment . . . risks only
benefiting local governments rather than advancing the goals of the underlying
claims.”).
61. Shepherd, supra note 10, at 452.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Redish et al., supra note 19, at 632.
65. Miller v. Steinbach, No. 66 Civ. 356, 1974 WL 350, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 3,
1974).
66. Id.
67. Redish et al., supra note 19, at 653.
68. Id.
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have approved of at least one form of cy pres distribution69 but di-
verge in their approaches.70
1. Types of Cy Pres Distributions
Federal courts have approved two general types of cy pres set-
tlements.71  The first type—which this Comment will refer to as
“part cy pres settlements”—follows the distribution scheme that
Shepherd’s comment proposed.72  Part cy pres settlements dis-
tribute residual settlement funds to a third party after all individual
claims have been satisfied.73
The second type of cy pres settlement directs the entire settle-
ment fund to a third party.74  In this second scenario, there is no
direct individual recovery.75  Courts refer to these settlements as
“cy pres-only settlements.”76  While courts generally agree that part
cy pres settlements are permissible,77 cy pres-only settlements tend
to stir up controversy.78
69. See, e.g., In re Google Referrer Header Privacy Litig., 869 F.3d 737 (9th
Cir. 2017); Hughes v. Kore of Ind. Enter., 731 F.3d 672 (7th Cir. 2013); In re Baby
Prods. Antitrust Litig., 708 F.3d 163 (3d Cir. 2013); In re Pharm. Indus. Average
Wholesale Price Litig., 588 F.3d 24 (1st Cir. 2009); Airline Ticket Comm’n Anti-
trust Litig. Travel Network v. United Air Lines, 307 F.3d 679 (8th Cir. 2002) (re-
manding settlement for revised cy pres recipient); In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab.
Litig., 818 F.2d 179 (2d Cir. 1987).
70. See cases cited supra note 69.
71. PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIG. § 3.07 cmt. a (AM. LAW
INST. 2010).
72. See generally Shepherd, supra note 10 (discussing the use of cy pres to
dispose of unclaimed settlement funds).
73. PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIG. § 3.07 cmt. a.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. See, e.g., In re Google Referrer Header Privacy Litig., 869 F.3d 737,
741–43 (9th Cir. 2017).
77. See, e.g., In re Baby Prods. Antitrust Litig., 708 F.3d 163, 172 (3d Cir.
2013) (“[A] district court does not abuse its discretion by approving a class action
settlement agreement that includes a cy pres component . . . .”); Nachshin v. AOL,
LLC, 663 F.3d 1034, 1038 (9th Cir. 2011) (noting that cy pres distributions are
permissible methods for disposing of unclaimed settlement funds); In re Pharm.
Indus. Average Wholesale Price Litig., 588 F.3d 24, 35–36 (1st Cir. 2009) (approv-
ing the use of cy pres to dispose of residual settlement funds); In re Airline Ticket
Comm’n Antitrust Litig., 268 F.3d 619, 625–26 (8th Cir. 2001) (finding distribution
of unclaimed settlements through cy pres proper if the recipient closely relates to
the class).
78. See Joshua L. Becker & Brad M. Strickland, Increased Scrutiny for Cy
Pres Provisions in Class Action Settlements, LAW J. NEWSL.: PROD. LIAB. L. &
STRATEGY (Oct. 2017), https://bit.ly/2O43r6F.
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2. Considerations in Assessing Cy Pres Distributions
While the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure govern the circum-
stances under which a judge may approve a class action settle-
ment,79 no rule explicitly addresses settlement agreements that
contain cy pres provisions.80  Instead, courts generally assess the
propriety of a cy pres settlement under the same standards that gov-
ern settlement agreements in general—those provided by Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 23(e).81
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(e) governs judicial ap-
proval of federal class action settlements and permits approval only
if the settlement is “fair, reasonable, and adequate” in its entirety.82
To determine whether a settlement meets the Rule 23(e) bench-
mark, courts consider a range of factors, such as:  (1) the expense
and complexity of the litigation; (2) the class’s reaction to the settle-
ment; (3) the stage of the proceedings and the amount of discovery
completed; (4) the risks of litigation; (5) the risks of maintaining the
class action through trial; (6) the ability of the defendants to with-
stand a greater judgment; (7) the settlement’s reasonableness in
light of the best possible recovery; and (8) the reasonableness of the
settlement fund in light of the plaintiffs’ likelihood of success on the
merits.83
The American Law Institute has set forth model guidelines in
its Principles of the Law of Aggregate Litigation (“ALI Principles”)
for courts to consider when assessing cy pres settlements.84  Section
3.07 of the ALI Principles addresses two aspects of cy pres settle-
ments.85  Subsections (a) and (b) address when a cy pres settlement
79. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e).
80. In re Baby Prods. Antitrust Litig., 708 F.3d 163, 172–73 (3d Cir. 2013).
81. Id. at 173 (“Inclusion of a cy pres provision by itself does not render a
settlement unfair, unreasonable, or inadequate.”).
82. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(2).
83. See Hanlon v. Chrysler Corp., 150 F.3d 1011, 1027 (9th Cir. 1998); Girsh v.
Jepson, 521 F.2d 153, 157 (3d Cir. 1975); City of Detroit v. Grinnell Corp., 495 F.2d
448, 463 (2d Cir. 1974), abrogated by Goldberger v. Integrated Res., Inc., 209 F.3d
43 (2d Cir. 2000).
84. See PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIG. § 3.07 (AM. LAW
INST. 2010).
85. See id.
\\jciprod01\productn\D\DIK\123-1\DIK107.txt unknown Seq: 11 19-OCT-18 14:50
2018] RECALIBRATING CY PRES SETTLEMENTS 291
is proper—the triggering requirement.86  Subsection (c) addresses
the type of recipient that is proper—the nexus requirement.87
The ALI Principles embody a strong preference for direct dis-
tribution to class members and deem cy pres settlements appropri-
ate only when direct distribution is not “feasible.”88  Infeasibility
occurs when “class members cannot be reasonably identified” or
when distribution would not be “economically viable.”89  Courts
that have adopted the “economic viability” test require a settle-
ment’s proponent to show that the cost of individual distribution,
including the costs of locating class members, outweighs the value
of individual awards.90
The ALI Principles provide that once a court deems a cy pres
distribution proper, it must determine whether the cy pres recipi-
ent’s interests “reasonably approximate those being pursued by the
class.”91  A court may direct a cy pres distribution to a party whose
86. Section 3.07(a)–(b) of the ALI Principles provides:
A court may approve a settlement that proposes a cy pres remedy even if
such a remedy could not be ordered in a contested case. The court must
apply the following criteria in determining whether a cy pres award is
appropriate:
(a) If individual class members can be identified through reasonable
effort, and the distributions are sufficiently large to make individual
distributions economically viable, settlement proceeds should be dis-
tributed directly to individual class members.
(b) If the settlement involves individual distributions to class members
and funds remain after distributions (because some class members
could not be identified or chose not to participate), the settlement
should presumptively provide for further distributions to participating
class members unless the amounts involved are too small to make indi-
vidual distributions economically viable or other specific reasons exist
that would make such further distributions impossible or unfair.
Id. § 3.07(a)–(b).
87. Section 3.07(c) of the ALI Principles provides:
(c) If the court finds that individual distributions are not viable based
upon the criteria set forth in subsections (a) and (b), the settlement may
utilize a cy pres approach. The court, when feasible, should require the
parties to identify a recipient whose interests reasonably approximate
those being pursued by the class.  If, and only if, no recipient whose inter-
ests reasonably approximate those being pursued by the class can be
identified after thorough investigation and analysis, a court may approve
a recipient that does not reasonably approximate the interests being pur-
sued by the class.
Id. § 3.07(c).
88. Id. § 3.07, cmt. a.
89. Id.
90. See, e.g., Lane v. Facebook, Inc., 696 F.3d 811, 817–21 (9th Cir. 2012)
(finding distribution of a settlement fund of $6.5 million to a class of over 3.6 mil-
lion members infeasible because individual payments would have been de
minimis).
91. PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIG. § 3.07(c).
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interests do not “reasonably approximate” the interests of the class
only if it cannot identify a “reasonably approximate” party after
“thorough investigation and analysis.”92  While most courts require
some nexus between the interests of the class and the interests of
the cy pres recipient,93 others seemingly pay mere lip service to the
nexus requirement.94  Even still, other courts have suggested that
the nexus requirement may be unnecessary altogether.95  And as cy
pres settlements become more common,96 the inconsistent ap-
proaches to these issues will only foster more confusion.  The
mounting pressure of these considerations clearly necessitates a re-
calibration of cy pres settlements.
III. ANALYSIS OF THE CIRCUIT SPLIT AND A PROPOSED
SOLUTION
Courts must consider two general questions when deciding
whether to approve a cy pres settlement.  First, a court must deter-
mine whether the circumstances trigger a justifiable use of cy pres.97
Second, a court must assess whether the cy pres recipients are ap-
propriate.98  Taking a holistic view, courts consider both questions
to determine whether the settlement is “fair, reasonable, and
adequate.”99
92. Id.
93. See, e.g., In re Airline Ticket Comm’n Antitrust Litig. Travel Network, 268
F.3d 619, 625–26 (8th Cir. 2001) (finding distribution of cy pres funds to a law
school in an antitrust action concerning caps on ticket commission did not reasona-
bly approximate the interests of the class).
94. See In re Google Referrer Header Privacy Litig., 869 F.3d 737, 746–47 (9th
Cir. 2017) (approving a cy pres distribution to plaintiff counsel’s alma mater in an
internet privacy action). But see Six (6) Mexican Workers v. Ariz. Citrus Growers,
904 F.2d 1301, 1308–09 (9th Cir. 1990) (finding the interests of a humanitarian
organization working in the region from which class members immigrated too re-
mote from the interests of class members in a migrant rights action).
95. See Hughes v. Kore of Ind. Enter., 731 F.3d 672, 676 (7th Cir. 2013)
(“When there’s not even an indirect benefit to the class . . . , the ‘cy pres’ remedy
. . . is purely punitive.”).
96. Redish et al., supra note 19, at 653.
97. See In re Pharm. Indus. Average Wholesale Price Litig., 588 F.3d 24, 34
(1st Cir. 2009) (discussing cases where courts have found circumstances that trigger
a justifiable use of cy pres).
98. See In re BankAmerica Corp. Sec. Litig, 775 F.3d 1060, 1067 (8th Cir.
2015) (noting that a district court must find that the recipient of a cy pres distribu-
tion will benefit the class before it may approve a cy pres settlement); In re Lupron
Mktg. & Sales Practices Litig., 677 F.3d 21, 33 (1st Cir. 2012) (noting that the cy
pres recipient must reasonably approximate the interests of the class).
99. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(2); see In re Baby Prods. Antitrust Litig., 708 F.3d
163, 172–73 (3d Cir. 2013) (“[A]pproval is warranted when the court finds that the
settlement, taken as a whole, is ‘fair, reasonable, and adequate’ from the perspec-
tive of the class.” (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(2))).
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Both types of cy pres settlements trigger when the settlement
fund is “non-distributable.”100  For part cy pres settlements, a settle-
ment fund is non-distributable when monies remain unclaimed after
the individual claims process has elapsed.101  For cy pres-only settle-
ments, courts deem a settlement fund non-distributable when the
cost of distribution to the class outweighs the value of the individual
awards.102
Generally, a cy pres recipient is appropriate if it constitutes the
“next best” recipient.103  That determination requires courts to con-
sider whether a “substantial nexus” between the interests of the re-
cipient and the interests of the class exists.104  Courts often examine
the nature of the recipient’s work to determine whether the class
will actually benefit from the distribution.105  Both the mission106
and geographic scope107 of the recipient’s work factor into this in-
quiry.  Some courts consider the objectives of the statutes underly-
ing the plaintiffs’ claims.108  Even still, some courts have seemingly
abandoned the “next best” recipient principle altogether,109 and
100. See, e.g., In re Google Referrer Header Privacy Litig., 869 F.3d 737, 741
(9th Cir. 2017) (“[T]he cy pres doctrine permits a court to distribute . . . non-
distributable portions of a class action settlement fund to the ‘next best’ class of
beneficiaries for the indirect benefit of the class.”).
101. See, e.g., Powell v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 119 F.3d 703, 706–07 (8th Cir.
1997) (finding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it approved a cy
pres distribution of unclaimed funds after all individual claims had been satisfied).
102. See, e.g., Lane v. Facebook, Inc., 696 F.3d 811, 825 (9th Cir. 2012) (af-
firming the district court’s approval of a cy pres-only settlement on the grounds
that individual awards would be de minimis).
103. See, e.g., Nachshin v. AOL, LLC, 663 F.3d 1034, 1036 (9th Cir. 2011);
Masters v. Wilhelmina Model Agency, Inc., 473 F.3d 423, 436 (2d Cir. 2007).
104. See, e.g., Lane, 696 F.3d at 822 (“[A] district court should not approve a
cy pres distribution unless it bears a substantial nexus to the interests of the class
members.”).
105. See Six (6) Mexican Workers v. Ariz. Citrus Growers, 904 F.2d 1301,
1309 (9th Cir. 1990) (finding the cy pres distribution did not adequately target the
plaintiff class).
106. Id. (finding distribution improper because the interests of the cy pres
recipient, an organization devoted to providing humanitarian aid, did not align
with the interest of a class made up of farm laborers).
107. See, e.g., Houck v. Folding Carton Admin. Comm., 881 F.2d 494, 502 (7th
Cir. 1989) (remanding for the district court to consider to some degree a “broader
nationwide use of its cy pres discretion” because the case involved nationwide
harm).
108. See Nachshin, 663 F.3d at 1036 (“Cy pres distributions must account for
. . . the objectives of the underlying statutes . . . .”); In re Airline Ticket Comm’n
Antitrust Litig. Travel Network, 307 F.3d 679, 683 (8th Cir. 2002) (explaining that a
proper cy pres recipient should relate to the statutory injury).
109. See, e.g., In re Motorsports Merch. Antitrust Litig., 160 F. Supp. 2d 1392,
1396–99 (N.D. Ga. 2001) (distributing $1.85 million from a price-fixing class action
settlement relating to merchandise sold at professional stock car races to a chil-
dren’s hospital); Superior Beverage Co., Inc. v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., 827 F. Supp.
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others have opined that the recipient’s identity is irrelevant so long
as the settlement functions as a deterrent.110
A court’s particular stance toward the theory behind the doc-
trine’s importation into the class action context influences its ap-
proach to both questions—that is, whether the circumstances
trigger the use of cy pres and whether the cy pres recipients are
appropriate.111  The cy pres doctrine emerged within the class ac-
tion settlements context to strike a balance between two competing
objectives:  compensation and deterrence.112
Compensating small individual harms is a primary objective of
the class action, particularly where the cost of individual litigation
would outweigh the value of recovery.113  Escheatment undermines
the compensation objective because the benefit of the settlement
distributes to persons whom the defendant has not harmed.114
Class actions also serve a deterrence objective.115  While gov-
ernment agencies properly deter misconduct consistent with the
law,116 the Supreme Court has acknowledged that the class action
device provides a mechanism by which private parties can seek
remedies for injuries that have gone unaddressed by the govern-
477, 480 (N.D. Ill. 1993) (awarding $2 million from an antitrust class action settle-
ment to an art museum, the American Jewish Congress, a public television station,
and the ACLU).
110. See Hughes v. Kore of Ind. Enter., 731 F.3d 672, 676 (7th Cir. 2013).
111. Compare In re Baby Prods. Antitrust Litig., 708 F.3d 163, 174 (3d Cir.
2013) (emphasizing the importance of assessing the “degree of direct benefit pro-
vided to the class” when deciding whether to approve a cy pres settlement), with
Hughes, 731 F.3d at 677–78 (suggesting a preference for cy pres due to its ability to
preserve the deterrent objective of class actions).
112. In re Baby Prods., 708 F.3d at 172; see generally Shepherd, supra note 10
(arguing that incorporating the cy pres doctrine into the context of class action
settlements would offset the undermining effects of escheatment and reversion).
113. See, e.g., Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 161 (1974) (finding
that “[e]conomic realities” sometimes demand that an individual’s claim be as-
serted through the class action device to compensate individuals for minor
injuries).
114. In re Baby Prods., 708 F.3d at 172.
115. See, e.g., Hughes, 731 F.3d at 677 (“A class action, like litigation in gen-
eral, has a deterrent as well as a compensatory objective.”); Blackie v. Barrack, 524
F.2d 891, 903 (9th Cir. 1975) (“The availability of the class action to redress such
frauds has been consistently upheld . . . in large part because of the substantial role
that the deterrent effect of class actions plays in accomplishing the objectives of
the securities laws.”) (citations omitted).
116. See, e.g., William B. Rubenstein, On What a Private Attorney General
Is—And Why It Matters, 57 VAND. L. REV. 2129, 2139 (2004) (“[P]rivate attorneys
represent individual clients with private interests while public attorneys represent
the citizenry at large pursuing their public interest.”).
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ment regulatory system.117  Reversion undermines deterrence by al-
lowing defendants to “walk[ ] away from the litigation scot-free.”118
While the cy pres doctrine theoretically preserves both objec-
tives,119 courts approach cy pres settlements with unspoken prefer-
ence for one objective to the other’s detriment.120  An examination
of divergent judicial rationales reveals the nature of this unspoken
favoritism.121
A. Courts that Favor the Compensation Objective
1. The Third Circuit’s “Degree of Direct Benefit” Test
The Third Circuit considered the propriety of cy pres settle-
ments for the first time in 2013.122  In In re Baby Products Antitrust
Litigation,123 the court reviewed a trial court’s approval of a part cy
pres settlement arising from a price-fixing lawsuit.124  The settle-
ment agreement required the defendants to deposit $35.5 million
into a settlement fund for distribution through an individual claims
process and mandated the disposal of unclaimed funds through cy
pres.125  The agreement allowed both parties to recommend up to
two potential cy pres recipients, but it gave the court the power to
choose the unclaimed funds’ destination.126
The agreement entitled individual claimants to different levels
of compensation based on the documentation they submitted.127
The trial court estimated that the class would receive approximately
$8.1 million of the settlement fund through individual distribu-
117. Deposit Guar. Nat’l Bank v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326, 339 (1980) (“The ag-
gregation of individual claims in the context of a classwide suit is an evolutionary
response to the existence of injuries unremedied by the regulatory action of
government.”).
118. Hughes, 731 F.3d at 676.
119. In re Baby Prods., 708 F.3d at 172 (“Cy pres distributions . . . preserve
the deterrent effect, but . . . more closely tailor the distribution to the interests of
class members, including those absent members who have not received individual
distributions.”).
120. Compare In re Baby Prods., 708 F.3d at 174 (emphasizing the importance
of assessing the “degree of direct benefit provided to the class” when deciding
whether to approve a cy pres settlement), with Hughes, 731 F.3d at 677–78 (sug-
gesting a preference for cy pres due to its ability to preserve the deterrent objective
of class actions).
121. Infra Part III.D.
122. See In re Baby Prods., 708 F.3d at 171.
123. In re Baby Prods. Antitrust Litig., 708 F.3d 163 (3d Cir. 2013).
124. Id. at 170.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 170–71.
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tions.128  However, on review, the Third Circuit found that the class
would actually receive roughly $3 million because the majority of
claimants were only eligible for the lowest level of compensation—
a fact that the trial court was unaware of when it approved the
settlement.129
The Third Circuit held that part cy pres settlements are permis-
sible disposal methods for unclaimed settlement funds so long as
the approving court directs the distribution to a third party that will
use the award for “a purpose related to the class injury.”130  How-
ever, the court reversed the district court’s decision, finding that the
district court based its approval of the settlement on insufficient
facts regarding the true amount of funds being distributed directly
to the class.131  The court further highlighted its preference for di-
rect distributions132 and emphasized that any settlement must be
fair, reasonable, and adequate from the perspective of the class as a
whole.133
The court also seized the opportunity to add an additional in-
quiry to the analysis it had previously established for approving
class action settlements:  the “degree of direct benefit” that the set-
tlement provides to the class.134  That additional inquiry, together
with the court’s mandate that cy pres distributions “be used for a
purpose related to the class injury,”135 arguably reflects the court’s
preference for preserving the compensation objective.136
The degree-of-direct-benefit test has impeded the use of cy
pres within the Third Circuit.137  For example, in Johnson v. Famous
Dave’s of America, Inc.,138 a district court denied a cy pres-only set-
tlement even after several attempts to distribute the settlement
128. Id. at 171.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 172.
131. Id. at 175.
132. Id. at 173.
133. In re Baby Prods., 708 F.3d at 174.
134. Id.  The court found several factors relevant to this inquiry, including
“the number of individual awards compared to both the number of claims and the
estimated number of class members, the size of the individual awards compared to
claimants’ estimated damages, and the claims process used to determine individual
awards.” Id.
135. Id. at 172.
136. See infra Part III.D.
137. See Johnson v. Famous Dave’s of Am., Inc., No.  12-344, 2013 WL
12149707, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 7, 2013) (denying approval of a cy pres-only settle-
ment based on the Third Circuit’s degree-of-direct-benefit test).
138. Johnson v. Famous Dave’s of Am., Inc., No.  12-344, 2013 WL 12149707
(E.D. Pa. Mar. 7, 2013).
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funds directly to the class failed.139  The district court acknowledged
that the proposed cy pres distribution resulted from the class’s fail-
ure to submit any valid claims.140  However, it nevertheless deemed
the settlement invalid in light of the Baby Products decision be-
cause none of the funds would go to the “direct benefit to the
class.”141
More recently, a district court in the Third Circuit ostensibly
sidestepped the degree-of-direct-benefit test altogether.142  In In re
Google Inc. Cookie Placement Consumer Privacy Litigation,143 the
United States District Court for the District of Delaware approved
a $5.5 million cy pres-only settlement in an electronic privacy suit
involving millions of potential class members.144  In its opinion, the
court did not mention the degree to which the class would benefit
from the settlement.145  Instead, the court deemed a factual distinc-
tion from Baby Products sufficient to render the decision inapplica-
ble.146  Rather than following the circuit’s governing test, the court
adopted an analysis commonly employed in other circuits;147 it ex-
amined whether the cy pres distributions bore a “direct and sub-
stantial nexus to the interests of absent class members.”148
2. The Eighth Circuit’s Strict Adherence to the “Next Best
Recipient” Principle
The Eighth Circuit has expressed skepticism toward the legiti-
macy of applying the cy pres doctrine to class action settlements.149
Such skepticism has materialized in decisions that severely limit the
use of cy pres settlements.150  In In re BankAmerica Corporation
139. Id. at *2.
140. Id. (“[T]he Court is sympathetic to concerns about . . . the difficulty of
identifying the class members . . . .”).
141. Id.
142. See In re Google Inc. Cookie Placement Consumer Privacy Litig., No.
12–MD–2358 (SLR), 2017 WL 446121, at *4–5 (D. Del. Feb. 2, 2017) (approving a
cy pres-only settlement because the distributions bore a direct and substantial
nexus to the interests of the class).
143. In re Google Inc. Cookie Placement Consumer Privacy Litig., No.
12–MD–2358 (SLR), 2017 WL 446121 (D. Del. Feb. 2, 2017).
144. Id. at *1, *4.
145. See id. at *1–5.
146. Id. at *4.
147. See, e.g., Nachshin v. AOL, LLC, 663 F.3d 1034, 1036 (9th Cir. 2011).
148. In re Google Inc., 2017 WL 446121, at *4.
149. See In re BankAmerica Corp. Sec. Litig., 775 F.3d 1060, 1065 (8th Cir.
2015) (noting the potential for abuses that arise from applying a trust law doctrine
to the context of class action settlement).
150. See id. at 1063–67.
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Security Litigation,151 the Eighth Circuit reversed a district court’s
approval of a part cy pres settlement which the parties proposed
after two failed attempts to distribute the funds to the class.152
The lawsuit arose from alleged securities fraud claims, and the
lower court initially resolved the case by approving a $490 million
settlement.153  Approximately $6.9 million remained in the settle-
ment fund after the initial distribution in December 2004.154  After
a second court-ordered distribution in April 2009, approximately
$2.4 million remained unclaimed.155  After the second attempt to
distribute the funds failed, the district court ordered the remainder
of the funds to be disposed of via cy pres156 and designated a Mis-
souri legal services organization whose work included representing
victims of fraud as the recipient.157  The district court found that the
organization was a satisfactory recipient because it served individu-
als in the geographic location where the majority of the victims re-
sided and because the recipients would use the distribution to assist
future victims of fraud.158
The Eighth Circuit found that the circumstances did not trigger
an acceptable use of cy pres159 and that the cy pres recipient was
inappropriate.160  Regarding the triggering requirement, the court
found that cy pres settlements are permissible only when further
individual distributions are not feasible.161  The court explained that
the feasibility inquiry “must be based primarily on whether ‘the
amounts involved are too small to make individual distributions ec-
onomically viable.’”162  The court seemingly implied that the par-
ties must make additional distributions to individuals whose claims
had already been fully satisfied before they may consider a cy pres
distribution.163
Regarding the nexus requirement, the court suggested that the
Missouri legal services organization was not an acceptable recipient
151. In re BankAmerica Corp. Sec. Litig., 775 F.3d 1060 (8th Cir. 2015).
152. Id. at 1062, 1067.
153. Id. at 1062.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 1069 (dissenting opinion).
158. In re Bank of Am. Corp. Sec. Litig., No. 4:99–MD–1264 (CEJ), 2013 WL
3212514, at *4–5 (E.D. Mo. June 24, 2013).
159. See In re BankAmerica Corp., 775 F.3d at 1064–66.
160. Id. at 1067.
161. Id. at 1064.
162. Id. at 1065 (second emphasis added) (quoting PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW
OF AGGREGATE LITIG. § 3.07(c) (AM. LAW INST. 2010)).
163. See id. (“[A] cy pres distribution is not authorized by declaring . . . that
‘all class members submitting claims have been satisfied in full.’”).
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because other organizations more “closely approximate[ ] the inter-
ests of the class.”164  The court noted that a cy pres recipient must
serve “a purpose as near as possible to the legitimate objectives un-
derlying the lawsuit, the interests of class members, and the inter-
ests of those similarly situated.”165  Although the organization’s
work focused on a geographic region where many of the class mem-
bers lived166 and assisted fraud victims,167 the Eighth Circuit never-
theless directed the district court to select a recipient “more closely
tailored to the interests of the class and the purposes of the underly-
ing litigation.”168
B. Preserving Deterrence: The Seventh Circuit’s “Purely
Punitive” Approach
The Seventh Circuit views cy pres remedies as “purely puni-
tive.”169  In Hughes v. Kore of Indiana Enterprise, Inc.,170 the court
reversed a district court’s decision to decertify a class based, in part,
on a finding that the class members could recover more substantial
damage awards through individual lawsuits.171  The original class
action lawsuit alleged that the defendants, two companies that
owned ATMs, violated the Electronic Funds Transfer Act172 when
they failed to post certain notices on their ATMs.173  The statute
entitles a plaintiff in an individual action to either actual damages174
or statutory damages “not less than $100 nor greater than
$1,000.”175  The statute entitles the class in a class action to “such
amount as the court may allow,” but the amount may “not be more
than the lesser of $500,000 or 1 per centum of the net worth of the
defendant.”176  The parties had stipulated to limit damages to
$10,000—one percent of the defendants’ net worth—and that more
164. Id. at 1067.
165. Id. (quoting In re Airline Ticket Comm’n Antitrust Litig., 307 F.3d 679,
682 (8th Cir. 2002)).
166. In re Bank of Am. Corp. Sec. Litig., No. 4:99–MD–1264 (CEJ), 2013 WL
3212514, at *4 (E.D. Mo. June 24, 2013).
167. See id. at *5.
168. In re BankAmerica Corp. Sec. Litig., 775 F.3d 1060, 1067 (8th Cir. 2015).
169. Hughes v. Kore of Ind. Enter., 731 F.3d 672, 676 (7th Cir. 2013);
Mirfasihi v. Fleet Mortg. Corp., 356 F.3d 781, 784 (7th Cir. 2004).
170. Hughes v. Kore of Ind. Enter., 731 F.3d 672 (7th Cir. 2013).
171. Id. at 675, 678.
172. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1693–1693r (2018) (establishing rights, liabilities, and re-
sponsibilities of participants in electronic fund and remittance transfer systems).
173. Hughes v. Kore. of Ind. Enter., No. 1:11-cv-1329-JMS-MJD, 2013 WL
3467320, at *1 (S.D. Ind. July 10, 2013).
174. 15 U.S.C. § 1693m(a)(1).
175. Id. § 1693m(a)(2)(A).
176. Id. § 1693m(a)(2)(B).
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than 2,800 transactions occurred in the relevant timeframe.177  The
district court noted that if the number of transactions that occurred
resulted in 2,800 class members, individual recovery would amount
to approximately $3.57.178  Because the minimum recovery in an in-
dividual action would have been substantially higher under the cir-
cumstances, the lower court found the case unfit for class action
treatment.179
On review, the Seventh Circuit noted the unlikelihood of indi-
vidual lawsuits in such a case given the relatively small recovery
available.180  The Seventh Circuit also acknowledged that the indi-
vidual awards expected to emerge from the class action were likely
too small to incentivize class members to submit claims.181  How-
ever, the court also observed that the class action provides the ideal
mechanism for asserting small individual claims.182  The court ex-
plained that class actions serve both compensatory and deterrent
objectives.183  It suggested that the damages sought in the case
would likely “have a deterrent effect on future violations of the
Electronic Funds Transfer Act by [the defendants] and others.”184
The court then suggested that cy pres might provide the “best
solution” to the settlement distribution issues.185  In that instance,
the court explained, application of cy pres was especially appropri-
ate because it would preserve the deterrent value of the lawsuit,
and because individual distribution would provide “no meaningful
relief.”186  Importantly, the court stated that “prevent[ing] the de-
fendant from walking away from the litigation scot-free” justifies
the application of the cy pres doctrine in the class action context.187
In the Seventh Circuit’s view, cy pres distributions need not provide
any indirect benefit to the class when the value of individual recov-
ery is minimal because the settlement serves a “purely punitive”
function.188
177. Hughes v. Kore of Ind. Enter., 731 F.3d 672, 674 (7th Cir. 2013).
178. Hughes, 2013 WL 3467320, at *7.
179. Id. at *8.
180. Hughes, 731 F.3d at 675.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 677.
183. Id.
184. Id. at 678.
185. Id. at 675.
186. Id.
187. Id. at 676.
188. Id.
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C. Linking Cy Pres to the Litigation: The Ninth Circuit’s
Approach
The Ninth Circuit’s approach to cy pres settlements emphasizes
neither compensatory nor deterrent objectives, but instead focuses
on the settlement’s compatibility with the underlying litigation.189
Under the Ninth Circuit’s approach, cy pres provides a permissible
means for disposing of “unclaimed or non-distributable” settlement
funds.190  The court deems settlement funds “non-distributable”
when “the proof of individual claims would be burdensome or dis-
tribution of damages costly.”191  For example, the court has found
settlement funds “non-distributable” when the value of individual
awards would be de minimis.192
While the court requires cy pres distributions to constitute the
“next best distribution,”193 its interpretation of the “next best” prin-
ciple is not as strict as some of its sister courts.194  In the Ninth
Circuit’s view, a cy pres recipient may qualify as the “next best dis-
tribution” if it “bears a substantial nexus to the interests of the class
members.”195  The court considers two factors when assessing the
nexus requirement:  the objectives of the statutes on which the
plaintiffs base their claims and the interests of the silent class
members.196
First, the court examines the objectives of the statutes on which
the plaintiffs base their claims.197  For example, in In re Google Re-
ferrer Header Privacy Litigation,198 the court found that organiza-
tions dedicated to Internet privacy were permissible cy pres
recipients because the plaintiffs’ claims arose out of alleged online
privacy violations.199  By contrast, the court in Nachshin v. AOL,
189. See Nachshin v. AOL, LLC, 663 F.3d 1034, 1039 (9th Cir. 2011) (“[C]y
pres distribution[s] must be guided by (1) the objectives of the underlying stat-
ute(s) and (2) the interests of the silent class members.”).
190. Lane v. Facebook, Inc., 696 F.3d 811, 819 (9th Cir. 2011).
191. Id.
192. See In re Google Referrer Header Privacy Litig., 869 F.3d 737, 741–42
(9th Cir. 2017).
193. Six (6) Mexican Workers v. Ariz. Citrus Growers, 904 F.2d 1301, 1308
(9th Cir. 1990).
194. Compare id., with In re BankAmerica Corp. Sec. Litig., 775 F.3d 1060,
1067 (8th Cir. 2015).
195. Lane, 696 F.3d at 821.
196. See In re Google, 869 F.3d at 743 (“[W]e require cy pres awards to meet a
‘nexus’ requirement by being tethered to the objectives of the underlying statute
and the interests of the silent class members.”).
197. Id.
198. In re Google Referrer Header Privacy Litig., 869 F.3d 737 (9th Cir.
2017).
199. Id. at 743–44.
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LLC,200 a case involving electronic communications privacy claims,
found cy pres distributions to a legal aid organization, the Boys and
Girls Club, and the Federal Judicial Center Foundation were im-
proper because none of the recipients’ work aligned with “the
objectives of the underlying statutes on which [the plaintiffs based]
their claims.”201
Second, the court considers the interests of the silent class
members.202  The court determines whether the recipient’s work
serves common interests of the class as a whole.203  It also examines
the geographic scope of the recipient’s work to ensure that the ben-
efits derived from the settlement distribute across the class.204
D. Assessing the Current State of Cy Pres Among the Circuits
A thorough assessment of cy pres settlements should first take
into account the theory behind the cy pres doctrine’s application to
the class action context.205  Courts imported the cy pres doctrine
into class action settlements to preserve two unique objectives of
the class action:  compensation and deterrence.206  Previously, alter-
native methods of disposing leftover settlement funds undermined
both objectives.207  The cy pres doctrine provided a mechanism to
dispose of non-distributable settlement funds while preserving an
indirect benefit to injured parties208 and disincentivizing
misconduct.209
Over time, however, the various approaches courts have taken
to assess cy pres settlements have disturbed the balance that cy pres
established.210  Rather than using the cy pres doctrine to preserve
the compensatory and deterrence objectives, courts tend to elevate
the preservation of one objective over the other.211  The Third Cir-
cuit’s degree-of-direct-benefit test ensures that injured parties re-
200. Nachshin v. AOL, LLC, 663 F.3d 1034 (9th Cir. 2011).
201. Id. at 1040.
202. See Lane v. Facebook, Inc., 696 F.3d 811, 821 (9th Cir. 2011).
203. See Nachshin, 663 F.3d at 1040.
204. Id.
205. See Shepherd, supra note 10, at 452 (proposing the use cy pres in class
action settlements to balance the negative effects of other settlement distribution
options).
206. See id.
207. Id.
208. In re Google Referrer Header Privacy Litig., 869 F.3d 741 (9th Cir.
2017).
209. Hughes v. Kore of Ind. Enter., 731 F.3d 672, 675–78 (7th Cir. 2013).
210. Supra Part III.A–C.
211. Supra Part III.A–C.
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ceive compensation for their injuries.212  But the test fails to
account for situations where a recipient whose interests align with
the class injury does not exist.213  Nor does it leave room for situa-
tions where the class receives only minimal monetary benefits,214
such as settlements that produce de minimis individual awards.
Similarly, the Eighth Circuit’s strict adherence to the “next
best recipient” principle preserves the compensation objective by
requiring the parties to identify recipients that will provide the
greatest benefit to the class.215  Unfortunately, by demanding a
near-perfect match, the court fails to account for situations in which
a near-perfect match does not exist.216  The rigidity of the court’s
requirements diminishes deterrence, making it more likely that de-
fendants will “walk[ ] away from the litigation scot-free.”217
In contrast, the Seventh Circuit’s “purely punitive” approach
preserves the deterrence objective by facilitating class action suits
with relatively insignificant individual recoveries.218  But this ap-
proach risks opportunities for abuse that cause harm to the class.219
Plaintiffs’ attorneys might more willingly settle for lower damages if
they can collect their fees sooner.  The “purely punitive” approach
provides those attorneys the mechanism needed to carry out such a
dubious strategy and circumvent a searching inquiry into the fair-
ness of the settlement to the class as a whole.220
Cy pres settlements clearly require judicial recalibration.  Per-
haps a variant of the Ninth Circuit’s approach—anchored by the
class action objectives of compensation and deterrence—might re-
store the equilibrium.
E. Balancing the Objectives: A Proposed Solution
1. The Triggering Requirement
Although cy pres settlements constitute a unique type of class
action settlement, approval is nevertheless contingent on a court’s
212. See In re Baby Prods. Antitrust Litig., 708 F.3d 163, 172 (3d Cir. 2013).
213. Id.
214. See Lane v. Facebook, Inc., 696 F.3d 811, 825 (9th Cir. 2012) (deeming
the indirect benefit of a cy pres-only distribution appropriate because direct distri-
bution to the class would be too burdensome).
215. See In re BankAmerica Corp. Sec. Litig., 775 F.3d 1060, 1063–67 (8th Cir.
2015).
216. See id.
217. Hughes v. Kore of Ind. Enter., 731 F.3d 672, 676 (7th Cir. 2013).
218. Id. at 677.
219. See Mirfasihi v. Fleet Mortg. Corp., 356 F.3d 781, 784–85 (7th Cir. 2004).
220. Id. at 785.
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finding that the settlement is “fair, reasonable, and adequate.”221
Additionally, each class member has a constitutionally recognized
property interest in the claims that the settlement resolves.222  In
light of these principles, courts should only approve cy pres distri-
butions when direct distribution to the class is infeasible.223
For part cy pres settlements, courts should deem direct distri-
bution infeasible when settlement funds remain unclaimed after the
individual claims process deadline.224  Pro rata distributions to class
members who have received their entire share of the settlement
may be preferable.225  However, the parties’ decision not to dis-
tribute the funds pro rata should not bar approval unless the stat-
utes upon which the plaintiffs based their claims serve strict
compensatory objectives.226  Choosing cy pres distribution over pro
rata distribution would not undermine the compensatory objective
because cy pres distribution spreads the benefit of the settlement
across the class rather than concentrating it with a few identifiable
members.227  However, should the parties choose cy pres distribu-
tion, the recipient should align closely with the interests of the class
to ensure that the class derives an actual indirect benefit from the
distribution.228  In the context of cy pres-only settlements, courts
should deem direct distribution infeasible if either:  (1) individual
awards are de minimis and the cost of distribution exceeds the
award or (2) identifying class members is exceedingly difficult.229
2. The Nexus Requirement
Similar to the Ninth Circuit’s approach, assessment of pro-
posed cy pres recipients should begin with an examination of the
substantive statute upon which the plaintiffs base their claims.230
However, rather than focusing on the injury the statute seeks to
address, courts should focus on the broader purpose of the stat-
ute—specifically, whether the legislature intended the statute to
221. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(2); see also In re Baby Prods. Antitrust Litig., 708
F.3d 163, 172–73 (3d Cir. 2013) (discussing how cy pres settlements are subject to
Rule 23(e)(2)).
222. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 807–08 (1985).
223. See Lane v. Facebook, Inc., 696 F.3d 811, 821 (9th Cir. 2011).
224. See id. at 819.
225. See Powell v. Georgia-Pacific Corp. 119 F.3d 703, 706–07 (8th Cir. 1997).
226. See In re Holocaust Victim Assets Litig. Pink Triangle Coal., 424 F.3d
158, 168 (2d Cir. 2005).
227. In re Baby Prods. Antitrust Litig., 708 F.3d 163, 172 (3d Cir. 2013).
228. See Nachshin v. AOL, LLC, 663 F.3d 1034, 1040 (9th Cir. 2011).
229. See Lane v. Facebook, Inc., 696 F.3d 811, 821 (9th Cir. 2011).
230. See Nachshin, 663 F.3d at 1039.
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compensate injured parties or deter misconduct.231  Courts make
similar assessments in other areas of class actions.232  For example,
courts have considered whether Congress intended a substantive
statute to serve compensatory or deterrent objectives to assess
whether a case is suitable for class action treatment.233
If a court finds that Congress intended the underlying statute
to serve primarily compensatory objectives, the parties should des-
ignate a recipient that aligns with the common interests of the
class.234  This determination should account for both the injury in-
volved and the geographic scope of the class.235  However, courts
should not demand a perfect fit.236  Divesting a defendant of ill-
gotten gains may be a benefit in itself.237  But in cases where no
potential recipient that remotely aligns with the interests of the
class exists,238 parties should consider soliciting input from identifi-
able class members.239  Some scholars have suggested the use of
voting and crowd-sourcing technology.240  And courts have looked
favorably upon the practice of soliciting direct input from the class
during the selection process.241
Where the underlying statute serves a deterrence objective, the
“next best recipient” should be anyone but the defendant.242  For
claims based on statutes intended to deter misconduct, the common
interest of the class is to divest the defendant of ill-gotten gains.243
And the class nevertheless benefits from both having its injuries
vindicated and ensuring general deterrence against similarly situ-
231. See Hughes v. Kore of Ind. Enter., 731 F.3d 672, 677 (7th Cir. 2013) (“A
class action, like litigation in general, has a deterrent as well as a compensatory
objective.”).
232. See Six (6) Mexican Workers v. Ariz. Citrus Growers, 904 F.3d 1301,
1306–07 (9th Cir. 1990) (examining the underlying purpose of a statute to deter-
mine whether treatment of the case as a class action was preferred over individual
litigation).
233. Id.
234. See Lane, 696 F.3d at 821.
235. Id.
236. See In re BankAmerica Corp. Sec. Litig., 775 F.3d 1060, 1067 (8th Cir.
2015).
237. See Hughes v. Kore of Ind. Enter., 731 F.3d 672, 677 (7th Cir. 2013).
238. The parties should reach this conclusion only after a good faith effort.
239. See In re BankAmerica, 775 F.3d at 1066.
240. See Chris J. Chasin, Comment, Modernizing Class Action Cy Pres
Through Democratic Inputs: A Return to Cy Pres Comme Possible, 163 U. PA. L.
REV. 1463, 1488–90 (2015).
241. See In re BankAmerica, 775 F.3d at 1066.
242. See Hughes, 731 F.3d at 675–78.
243. See id. at 677.
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ated actors.244  The parties would benefit from soliciting class input
here as well, as it would provide the class an opportunity to deter-
mine how to carry out the deterrence function.245
IV. CONCLUSION
This Comment draws attention to the inconsistent ways in
which federal courts approach cy pres settlements.  In so doing, it
illuminates how those inconsistencies derive from, and run counter
to, the rationale behind the cy pres doctrine’s importation into the
class action context.  A close examination of how federal courts as-
sess cy pres settlements reveals unspoken judicial favoritism of the
competing class action objectives that cy pres settlements aim to
preserve.246  Courts must recalibrate their analytical frameworks to
ensure that the benefits of cy pres settlements remain viable.
Cy pres settlements offer a functional method for disposing of
otherwise non-distributable settlement funds.247  A comparison of
the available disposal methods shows that a properly executed cy
pres settlement is more consistent with the underlying objectives of
the class action than its counterparts.248  But if cy pres settlements
are to remain superior, courts must consider the rationale behind
the cy pres doctrine’s importation into the class action context.249
Incorporating that rationale into their assessments of cy pres settle-
ments might restore the equilibrium.
244. See Brian T. Fitzpatrick, Do Class Actions Deter Wrongdoing? 195–202
(Vand. U. L. Sch., Working Paper No. 17-40, 2017), http://bit.ly/2Qz4q09.
245. See In re BankAmerica, 775 F.3d at 1066; Chasin, supra note 240, at
1488–90.
246. See supra Part III.A–D.
247. See In re Baby Prods. Antitrust Litig., 708 F.3d 163, 172 (3d Cir. 2013)
(explaining the three options for disposing of non-distributable settlement funds).
248. Id. (“Among [the three disposal] options, cy pres distributions have ben-
efits over the alternative choices.”).
249. See supra Part III.E.
